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Dangerous Climate Change
dangerous climate change
Dangerous Climate Change
Extract from: David Spratt and Philip Sutton,
2008
CarbonEquity, Greenleap Strategic Institute
Climate
‘Code Red’
The Case for a
Sustainability Emergency
“ ‘Dangerous’ has become something of a
cliché when discussing climate change.”
— climate
researchers, writing in 2006 (Schneider and Lane, 2006).
“Arctic
climate change [is] centrally relevant to definition of dangerous human
interference.” — 2007 scientific paper (Hansen,
Sato et
al., 2007a)
What risk is acceptable in establishing “safe”
global
warming goals, policies and actions? In the absence of a well-informed
scientific consensus that harm would not ensue, the precautionary
principle suggests that if an action (or inaction) might cause severe
or irreversible harm to the public or the environment, the burden of
proof falls on those advocating the action (or inaction). For nuclear
power stations in the USA, the regulatory standard is that
there should
be no more that one-in-amillion risk of serious accident. In 2004, the
chance of being killed in a commercial air crash was about one in four
million. If instead the risk was one in a thousand — a 0.1%
chance — we would not fly.
Yet we seem to accept much higher risks as reasonable in setting global
warming targets. The talk is about a 20–30% species
loss for
a
rise of 2°C, very likely coral
reef destruction, possible
ice-sheet
disintegration and the prospects of economic damage
“on a
scale
similar to those associated with the great wars and the economic
depression of the first half of the 20th century” (according
to
Nicholas Stern) as if it were a game of chance, a poker hand where with
an ounce of luck the right cards will be dealt and the Earth will
“get out of jail” free.
It seems that we abide by one rule when our own personal safety is at
risk, but apply a much lower standard when it comes to the planet on
whose good grace our own survival rests. The precautionary principle
tells us to not risk actions that could trigger an irreversible chain
of climate change events or produce dangerous impacts. We cannot gamble
on how far we can push the system till it breaks, and then try and
unscramble the eggs. As is the case for civil aviation, climate change
safety policy must allow for less than a one-in-a-million chance of
catastrophic failure. Because biodiversity, our lives, and those of
succeeding generations are at stake, we must not choose
to accept a level of warming that creates an unacceptable risk of
unacceptable impacts. We need a model of the precautionary principle
that not only guides us to avoid unsustainability, but that also guides
us to get back to the safe zone if we have strayed outside that zone
already.
Yet risk and uncertainty have been turned on their head: “The
risk-averse nature of Article 2 of the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change) requires immediate and stringent reductions in
emissions of all greenhouse gases… because of scientific
uncertainty, not in spite of uncertainty. Uncertainty, however, has
been used as a reason for delay of emission reductions, presumably on
the grounds that future knowledge may show that near-term emission
reductions are unnecessary” (Harvey, 2007).
The 1992 UNFCCC urges stabilisation of greenhouse gases at a level: to
“prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate
system”; to be achieved within a time frame
“sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change; to ensure that
food production is not threatened; and to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner”. Climate ‘code
red’: The case for a sustainability emergency 25 While the
concept of “dangerous” is generally cast into the
future — for example, at a 2°C rise — other
judges, such as
the inhabitants of low-lying Pacific islands, know it is already
dangerous.
Suggested metrics for dangerous climate change (Schneider and Lane,
2006) include:
- risks to unique and threatened geophysical or biophysical
systems;
- risks associated with extreme
weather events;
- total damages;
- temperature thresholds to large-scale events;
- risks to global and local ecosystems;
- loss of human cultures;
- ‘millions
at risk’
— the
additional number of millions of people placed at risk;
- the five key sustainability metrics: water,
energy, health,
agriculture, and biodiversity;
- impacts at a pace beyond the capacity to adapt;
- triggering of an irreversible chain of events;
- early warning dangers present in certain areas that are
likely to spread and worsen over time with increased warming; and
- distributional metrics: inter-country equity,
intergenerational
equity, and inter-species equity.
Schneider and Lane (2006) also
propose five measurements:
- market costs in dollars per tonne of carbon (C);
- human lives lost in persons per tonne C;
- species lost per tonne C;
- distributional effects (such as changes in income
differentials between rich and poor) per tonne C; and
- quality of life changes, such as heritage sites lost per
tonne C or refugees created per tonne C.
And they note their “strong belief that such broad-based,
multi-metric approaches to impacts categorization and assessment are
vastly preferable to focusing solely on market categories of damages,
as is often done by traditional cost–benefit analyses.
‘One
metric’ aggregations probably underestimate the seriousness
of
climate impacts.” Pragmatically, there will be no easy
agreement between nations as to what the definition of dangerous will
be, nor
will quantities or caps be established. But the effort must be made to
get a genuinely ‘good enough’ consensus because the
stakes
are so high.
Of particular significance as a metric is the triggering of
irreversible chains of events, or “tipping points”.
The
climate system “is highly non-linear and is prone to abrupt
changes, threshold effects and irreversible changes (in a human time
frame)… very small changes in a forcing factor can trigger
surprisingly large and sometimes catastrophic changes in a
system… [and] propel the Earth into a different climatic and
environmental state. Examples include the rapid disintegration of the
large ice sheets on Greenland
and Antarctica
or large-scale and
uncontrollable feedbacks in the carbon cycle: activation of methane
clathrates buried under the coastal seas, the rapid loss of methane
from warmer and drier tundra ecosystems, increasing wildfires
in the
boreal and tropical zones, the conversion of the Amazon
rainforest to a
savannah and the release of CO2 from warming soils. Once a critical
threshold was crossed and such a series of processes was triggered, no
policy or management approaches could slow or reverse the
process” (Steffen, 2007). An example is the
“imminent
peril” we now face of “initiation of dynamical and
thermodynamical processes on the West Antarctic and Greenland ice
sheets that produce a situation out of humanity’s control,
such
that devastating sea level rise will inevitably occur”
(Hansen,
Sato et al., 2007b).
“A tipping point occurs when the climate state is
such
that, because of large ‘ready’ feedbacks, small
additional
forcing can cause large climate change. The ready feedbacks today are
provided by Arctic,
the West
Antarctic ice sheet, and much of the
Greenland ice. Little additional forcing is needed to trigger these
feedbacks because of global warming that is already in the
pipeline… Casualties of passing this tipping point would
include
more than wildlife and indigenous ways of life in the Arctic, and the
coastal environments and cities submerged by rising seas. The increased
global warming Climate ‘code red’: The case for a
sustainability emergency 26 would have world-wide effects via an
intensified hydrologic cycle…” (Hansen, 2008).
Thus
“tipping points is not only a valid concept, but it is what
distinguishes the global warming problem from other problems such as
the (particulate) air pollution problem… the upshot is a
real
danger that the system will run out of our control [and] these changes
will become unavoidable. As we realized years ago, we cannot
‘wait and see’ in the climate problem. We have to
be smart
enough to understand what is happening early on” (Hansen,
2007d).
So what does it mean to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system”? We suggest the goal is
a
climate safe for all people and all species over
“all”
generations, and we should not discount knowable impacts beyond our own
lifetime. The world has already overshot this goal. We have already
moved beyond a safe-climate planet and global warming is now causing
species
extinction and taking a toll in human lives. So how much
damage
from climate change are we prepared to tolerate? We can only answer
“the least amount possible” and certainly not
levels that
will overwhelm human and other species’ capacity to cope. One
has
only to read or watch day-by-day reports in the media to understand
that dangerous climate change is already here. Looking at Darfur, the
farmers along Australia’s failing Murray–Darling
river
system, collapsing ecosystems, the victims of the 2007 Greek and
Californian mega-fires, the coral stress, the species lost, the
changing patterns of the Asian monsoons, the fate of low-lying
Pacific
island communities and food production decline in sub-Saharan
Africa,
our world is already at the point of failing to cope. The United
Nation’s emergency relief coordinator, Sir John Holmes,
warned
that 12 of the 13 major relief operations in 2007 were climate related
and said this amounted to a climate change “mega
disaster”
(Borger, 2007). Climate change is already dangerous.
The complete report including the section on Dangerous Climate Change
is available online at: Climate Code Red
Dangerous Climate Change

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