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3 Degrees of Warming
3 Degrees of Warming
Extract
from: David Spratt and Philip Sutton, 2008
CarbonEquity, Greenleap Strategic Institute
Climate
‘Code Red’
The Case for a
sustainability Emergency
Are we getting the third degree?
“The global climate-science community has indicated that
changes of planetary temperature of even 1– 2°C have
the potential to bring about significant global exposures to coastal
erosion, sea-level rise, water supply and extreme climatic events, to
name but a few. The potential number of humans impacted by a
2°C change may count in the hundreds of millions. The European
Union has already set a target of maximum warming of 2°C in the
belief that warming beyond this represents an unreasonable risk of
“dangerous” climate change. Such a change in the
average global temperature might be regarded by many as small, but it
has the capacity to culminate in major consequences, something that
scientists feel is still under-appreciated in both public and private
policy development.” — Dr Graeme Pearman, 3
December 2007 (Pearman, 2007).
The rapid Arctic
melt now under way consigns the widely advocated 2°C warming
cap — always an unacceptable political compromise —
to the dust bin because it is demonstrably too high and would
eventually be a death sentence for billions of people and millions of
species as positive feedbacks work through the climate system. Yet
there are now suggestions that we should consider a 3 degrees C warming
cap, even though “the Earth’s history suggests that
with warming of 2–3°C the new equilibrium sea level
will include not only most of the ice from Greenland
and West
Antarctica, but a portion of East Antarctica, raising sea
level of the order of 25 meters. Contrary to lethargic ice sheet
models, real world data suggest substantial ice sheet and sea level
change in centuries, not millennia. The century time scale offers
little consolation to coastal dwellers, because they will be faced with
irregular incursions associated with storms and with continually
rebuilding above a transient water level” (Hansen, 2006d).
The brutal question is this: do those advocating a 3°C
understand in any significant way what 3°C really means? What
it means in tangible, physical terms? In the Pliocene, three million
years ago, temperatures were 3°C higher than our pre-industrial
levels, so it gives us an insight into the 3°C world. The
northern hemisphere was free of glaciers and ice sheets, beech trees
grew in the Transantarctic mountains, sea levels were 25 metres higher,
and atmospheric CO2 levels were 360–400 ppm, very similar to
today. There are also strong indications that during the Pliocene,
permanent El
Nino conditions prevailed. Rapid warming today is already
heating up the western Pacific Ocean, a basis for a coming period of
“super El Ninos”. Between 2°C and
3°C, the Amazon
rainforest, whose plants produce 10% of the world’s
terrestrial photosynthesis and which have no evolved resistance to
fire, may turn to savannah as drought and mega-fires first destroy the
rainforest, turning trees back into CO2 as they burn or rot and
decompose.
The carbon released by the forests’ destruction will be
joined by still more from the world’s soils, together
boosting global temperatures by a further 1.5ºC. It is
suggested that in human terms the effect on the planet will be like
cutting off oxygen during an asthma attack. A March 2007 conference at
Oxford talked about “corridors of probability”,
with models predicting the risk of the Amazon passing a
“tipping point” at 10–40% over the next
few decades.
The UK’s Hadley Centre climate change model, best known for
warning of catastrophic losses of Amazon forest, predicts that under
current levels of greenhouse gas emissions, the chances of such a
drought would rise from 5% now (one every 20 years) to 50% by 2030, and
to 90% by 2100.
The collapse of the Amazon is part of the reversal of the carbon cycle
projected to happen around 3°C, a view confirmed by a range of
researchers using carbon-coupled climate models. 3 degrees C would
likely see increasing and significantly large areas of the terrestrial
environment being rendered essentially uninhabitable by drought and
heat. Rainfall in Mexico and Central America is projected to fall by
50%. Southern Africa would be exposed to perennial drought, a huge
expanse centred on Botswana could see a remobilisation of old sand
dunes, much as is projected to happen earlier in the US west. The
Rockies would be snowless and the Colorado river will fail half the
time. Drought
intensity in Australia could triple.
With extreme
weather continuing to bite — hurricanes
may increase in power by half a category above today’s
top-level Category Five — world food
supplies will be critically endangered. This could mean
hundreds of millions — or even billions — of refugees
moving out from areas of famine and drought in the sub-tropics towards
the mid-latitudes. As the Himalayan
ice sheet relentlessly Climate ‘code red’: The case
for a sustainability emergency 30 melts with rising temperatures, the
long-term water flows into Asia’s great rivers and
breadbasket valleys — the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra, the
Mekong, Yangtse and Yellow rivers — will fall dramatically.
If global temperatures rise by 3°C (and that’s
becoming the unofficial target for some rich-country governments),
water flow in the Indus is predicted to drop by 90% by 2100. The lives
of two billion people
are at stake. For all this, 3 degrees C is the cap
effectively being advocated by the Australian Labor Party (ALP) in its
policy “Labor’s Greenhouse Reduction Target
— 60% by 2050 Backed By the Science” released on 2
May 2007 by environment spokesperson Peter Garrett, which advocates a
60% reduction in Australian emissions from 2000 levels by 2050
(Garrett, 2007).
The fully developed 60/2050 goal was first formally articulated by a
major organisation in 2000 when it was recommended by the UK Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution, to which the ALP’s
policy statement makes reference. However, the core idea — of
making a 60% cut in CO2 emissions compared to 1990 levels —
was given prominence a decade earlier in the first science assessment
of the IPCC. This was not presented as a goal as such but was provided
by the scientists to help policy makers calibrate the scale of the
challenge (Leggett, 2001).
The immediate source of inspiration for Labor’s 60/2050
target appears to be the advocacy of Sir
Nicholas Stern who, when all is said and done, advocated
a 3 degrees C target in his 2006 report to the UK government.
Stern said that constraining greenhouse gas levels to 450 ppm CO2e
“means around a 50:50 chance of keeping global increases
below 2°C above pre-industrial [and it] is unlikely that
increases will exceed 3 Degrees C”. But, he said,
keeping levels to 450 ppm CO2e is “already nearly out of
reach” because “450 ppm means peaking in the next
five years or so and dropping fast”. In other words, it would
require immediate and strong action that Stern judged to be neither
politically likely nor economically desirable because he thought that
the UK and other western governments would not be prepared to direct
sufficient resources to solve the problem. So instead Stern
pragmatically says the data “strongly suggests that we should
aim somewhere between 450 and 550 ppm CO2e”, but his policy
proposals demonstrate that he has the higher figure in mind as a
practical goal: “It is clear that stabilising at 550 ppm
[CO2e] or below involves strong action… but such
stabilisation is feasible” even though “550 ppm is
risky”. So his policy framework is focused on constraining
the increase to 550 ppm, at which level “there is around a
50:50 chance of keeping increases below 3°C (and it is)
unlikely that increases would exceed 4°C” (Stern,
2006a, 2006b).
It is beyond reasonable doubt that Stern identifies a 2ºC cap
with 450 ppm CO2e and a 3ºC cap with 550 ppm CO2e, noting that
for the latter target “the power sector around the world will
have to be at least 60% de-carbonised by 2050 and with a bigger
proportion de-carbonised in rich countries” (Stern, 2006a,
emphasis added). Stern’s last point is often overlooked. The
60/2050 link to a 3ºC cap was reiterated during
Stern’s March 2007 visit to Australia, when he told
“The Age” that “It would be a very good
idea if all rich countries, including Australia, set themselves a
target for 2050 of at least 60% emissions reductions” because
“the planet would be left with about 550 ppm of CO2
equivalent by 2050” and this would “leave us
roughly a 50/50 chance of being either side of 3ºC above
pre-industrial times” (Hannam, 2007).
A number of others have followed in Stern’s footsteps,
including ex-ABARE chief Dr Brian Fisher, Australia’s lead
delegate to the May 2007 IPCC meeting, who says the 2ºC
target, with emissions peaking by 2015, “is exceedingly
unlikely to occur… global emissions are growing very
strongly… On the current trajectories you would have to say
plus 3ºC is looking more likely” (Minchin, 2007b).
The shift in the pragmatic goal is plain in the 2007 IPCC Working Group
III report. Of the 177 research scenarios assessed for future emissions
profiles, only six dealt with limiting the rise to the range of
2–2.4ºC. By contrast, 118 covered the range of
3.2–4ºC, which suggests that the IPCC scientists,
following the lead of the politicians, have also largely shifted focus
from 2ºC (IPCC, 2007).This whole dialogue about 450 ppm or 550
ppm, 2ºC or 3ºC needs to be considered from two other
perspectives: climate sensitivity, and the threat of triggering mass
loss of ocean algae.
If we accept the view that long-term climate sensitivity (including
“slow” feedbacks) is around 6°C, then a
doubling of CO2 levels to 550 ppm will in the end produce a 6°C
increase. To be brutal, Stern’s 550 ppm target is a
6°C increase and contemplating a 550 ppm policy target for
Australia is setting an equilibrium temperature rise of 6°C as
policy. And we know that “the last time the planet was
5°C warmer, just prior to the glaciation of Antarctica about 35
million years ago, there were no large ice sheets on the planet. Given
today’s ocean basins, if the ice sheets melt entirely, sea
level will rise about 70 meters” (Hansen, 2007e).
And what if a target of 550ppm were to result in the destruction of the
ocean’s greatest CO2 sink? In peer-reviewed research
published in “Nature”, it was demonstrated that it
is likely that when CO2 exceeds 500 ppm, the global temperature
suddenly rises 6°C and becomes stable again at this elevated
temperature despite further increases or decreases of atmospheric CO2
(Lovelock and Kump, 1994). This contrasts with the IPCC models that
predict that temperature rises and falls smoothly with increasing or
decreasing CO2. Explaining the research, Lovelock points out that as
the ocean surface temperature warms to over 12°C, “a
stable layer of warm water forms on the surface that stays unmixed with
the cooler, nutrient-rich waters below. This purely physical property
of ocean water denies nutrients to the life in the warm layer, and soon
the upper sunlit ocean water becomes a desert”, recognized by
the clear azure blue, dead water of most of today’s ocean
surface. In such nutrient-deprived water, ocean life cannot prosper and
soon “the surface layer is empty of all but a limited and
starving population of algae”. Algae, which constitute most
of the ocean’s plant life, are the world’s greatest
CO2 sink, pumping down CO2, as well as contributing to cloud cover by
releasing dimethyl sulphide (DMS) into the atmosphere, a gas connected
with the formation of clouds and with climate, so that warmer seas and
fewer algae will likely reduce cloud formation and further enhance
positive feedback. Lovelock says severe disruption of the algae/DMS
relation would signal spiralling and irreversible climate change. Algae
prosper in waters below 10°C, so, as the climate warms, the
algae population reduces.
The modelling of climate warming and regulation by Lovelock and Kump
suggests that “as the CO2 abundance approached 500 ppm,
regulation began to fail and there was a sudden upward jump in
temperature. The cause was the failure of the ocean ecosystem. As the
world grew warmer, the algae were denied nutrients by the expanding
warm surface of the oceans, until eventually they became extinct. As
the area of ocean covered by algae grew smaller, their cooling effect
diminished and the temperature surged upwards.” The end
result was a temperature rise of 8°C above pre-industrial
levels, which would result in the planet being habitable only from the
latitude of Melbourne south to the south pole, and northern Europe,
Asia and Canada to the north pole (Lovelock, 2006).
So, just as events on the ground compel us to conclude that the cap
needs to be substantially less than 1ºC, we are now getting
the third degree (in reality, the sixth degree) as 2ºC fades
as a supposedly “unrealistic” compromise. Policy
and goal-setting seem precariously wedged between scientific need and
political “reality”, an ambivalence keenly
expressed in Stern’s work.
The science established long ago demanded a cap well below 2°C
to avoid dangerous impacts. James Hansen — before the Arctic
summer of 2007, which will likely cause a further revision downward in
his work — pointed to the need for a cap that was a safe
amount less than 1.7°C: “Earth’s positive
energy imbalance is now continuous, relentless and growing…
global warming of more than 1°C above today’s global
temperature [of 0.7°C] would likely constitute
‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ with
climate… This warming has brought us to the precipice of a
great ‘tipping point’. If we go over the edge, it
will be a transition to ‘a different planet’, an
environment far outside the range that has been experienced by
humanity. There will be no return within the lifetime of any generation
that can be imagined, and the trip will exterminate a large fraction of
species on the planet” (Hansen, 2005a, 2008). We have to keep
reminding ourselves that Hansen is talking as a scientist; this is not
just a rhetorical flourish to enliven his prose. Hansen has also
suggested that an increase of “even 1°C [over the
present] may be too great” (Hansen, 2007a), and more recently
that: “Proxy measures of CO2 amount and
climate simulations consistent with empirical data on climate
sensitivity both indicate that atmospheric CO2 amount when an ice sheet
first formed on Antarctica (34–35 million years before
present) was probably only 400–600 ppm. This information
raises the possibility that today’s CO2 amount, ~383 ppm, may
be, indeed, likely is already in the dangerous
range” (Hansen and Sato, 2007b). In court testimony in Iowa,
Hansen reaffirmed this view: “I am not recommending that the
world should aim for additional global warming of 1°C. Indeed,
because of potential sea level rise, as well as the other critical
metrics that I will discuss, I infer that it is desirable to avoid any
further global warming” (Hansen, 2007e).
But presumably because such a 1.7 ºC (over pre-industrial) cap
required drastic, politically challenging action, it was judged
“impractical” and a pragmatic, diplomatically
acceptable tradeoff of 2°C was agreed upon. Now as emissions
grow even more rapidly than expected, the 2°C cap is now
looking “impractical” and 3 degrees C hangs in the
air as “looking more likely”. One could imagine
that in another decade, 3 degrees C will be looking
“impractical” and 4ºC will be
“looking more likely”. Like heating a frog slowly,
3 Degrees of warming has only one certain outcome.
The complete report is available online at: Climate
Code Red
go from 3 Degrees back to Global Temperature

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